IN THE EMPLOYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL            Case Number:  EAT/0470/02/PM           


MR JOHN KEAR                                          Applicant




NEURAL TECHNOLOGIES                              Respondent










  1. The Employment Tribunal at Southampton has shown consistent bias throughout the whole of my case that is of such an extreme degree that I reasonably consider the court to be criminally corrupt. The court steadfastly refuses to administer justice and continuously misrepresents facts of evidence.
  2. On February 22nd 2000 the then Chairman, Mr Belcher, made a finding against the available evidence and subsequently misrepresented matters of fact and evidence in the Extended Reasons. I refer to pages 2-6 of the Sworn Bundle where Mr Belcher concedes that the newsletter was confidential, yet the Respondents later claim (Page 8 and 19) that there can be no confidentiality after publication. The testimony of my former advisor (page 10) confirms that this had been revealed to the court.
  3. Following a successful, albeit delayed appeal, the case was referred back to Southampton for the re-examination of evidence.
  4. At a Directions Hearing on December 9th 2001, the Respondent’s solicitor Mr Phillip Broom was openly colluding with the Chairman, Mr Twiss, before I was allowed to even enter the court.
  5. Despite the fact that the EAT had specifically referred the case back to Southampton to examine 35 contracts of confidentiality, Mr Twiss refused to order the release of 35 contracts of confidentiality stating that 3 would be sufficient to establish a point in law and that the court did not want to be burdened with paperwork. This is an error in law though he would not be moved. When I specified which 3 contracts I would like to see, in the full knowledge that the Respondents would not be able to produce these, he omitted the point from his order.
  6. Mr Twiss ordered the specific discovery of two e-mail conversations which were required as evidence. The Respondents have refused to release them and the court refuses to enforce the order.
  7. The Witness Order states that the Respondents were not informed that the order had been made yet the order was sent care of the Respondents and there was subsequent correspondence between the new CEO of Neural Technologies and the Tribunal as they decided whether to allow the witness’s attendance.
  8. Mr Twiss allowed me to amend my originating application to include a claim for unfair dismissal, on the basis that new evidence had since come to light evidence, which explained the true reason for my dismissal. Mr Twiss was unaware at this point of the wealth of evidence that I could produce to support my claim.
  9. On the day of the final hearing, February 6th 2002, the hearing was scheduled for 9:45am yet I was not allowed to enter the court until after 11:30am. The new chairman, Mr Cowling, apologised for the delay and then raised a preliminary point, of which I was previously unaware, disallowing my amended claim for unfair dismissal. He proceeded to waste time on this issue before adjourning the court for lunch.
  10. The court had ordered that all statements and evidence be submitted to the court at least 14 days prior to the hearing, yet the Chairman Mr Cowling was raising a preliminary point that I had no advance notification of, and therefore no chance to prepare a reasoned legal argument.
  11. In point 4 of the Extended Reasons Mr Cowling states that the court must consider “the injustice and hardship of refusing it [the amended application]”. The Respondents misrepresented the true reason why I was dismissed and I only discovered the facts, over a year later, while the original claim was being processed by the Appeal Tribunal. The actions of the Respondents have ruined my reputation, livelihood and health. If the court was truly committed to resolving the injustice and the resultant hardship caused, then they would have allowed the claim to proceed.
  12. In point 5 of the Extended Reasons Mr Cowling states that the facts were “within the knowledge of the applicant at the time of the Originating Application”. The evidence conclusively proves this not to be the case and Mr Cowling has misrepresented the facts.
  13. In point 9 Mr Cowling states “the prejudice to the Respondent if we were to allow the amendment outweighs the prejudice to the applicant in refusing it”. Mr Cowling states that the delay in the case is an important consideration. I have proven myself to be the innocent party, the delay evident in this case has therefore been a prejudice to me alone. I have been the victim of false accusations supported by fabricated evidence and perjury. Where Mr Cowling claims that delay prejudices recollection, this point is wholly immaterial because the facts of the matter are now backed up by documented evidence.
  14. I pointed out to Mr Cowling that the Tribunals have an ‘overriding objective’ to ensure fairness and an equal standing between the parties, especially where one party is unrepresented. He ignored this point, I contend that the refusal to allow the new claim had been predetermined when the court realised how much of it could be proven. Mr Twiss had previously allowed the claim to proceed.
  15. Returning from lunch, Mr Cowling’s opening statement was that he could not see why I was proceeding with this case because the Respondents had made an offer of settlement of £8000. He considered this to be a very generous offer. This amount is much less than the Respondents owe me by contract and which was due two and a half years ago, does not include an interest element, covers no damages, and the Respondents were still not admitting liability. He urged me to consider the settlement, threatened me with a potential costs order if I were to proceed with my claim and adjourned the court again for me to reconsider, wasting even more time.
  16. By the time Mr Cowling reconvened the court I was given one hour to present my evidence, a huge volume of evidence gathered over a two year period, and which justified more time. During the time I was allowed to present, Mr Cowling and his two colleagues kept interrupting the flow and making aggressive comments. When I presented the dated newsletter which proved that the Respondent’s argument was a blatant lie, Mr Cowling shouted at me “Where did you get this?” I contend that he was upset and uncomfortable because I used the barrister’s own argument to prove that the court had previously erred in law, and had attempted to cover up the fact. There can be no confidentiality after publication.
  17. The two panel members, Mrs Saunders and Mrs Angus were hostile in the extreme. One kept staring, shaking her head as I spoke and occasionally making tutting noises. The other was busily rifling through the evidence trying to find areas where I could be caught out. The panel were doing the job of the Respondent’s defence, this is not the purpose of an independent and unbiased Tribunal panel.
  18. On the matter of the confidentiality of the document which I passed to a colleague, Mr Cowling would not concede that there was no confidentiality in the material during the course of the hearing, continually criticising me that I had no right to send it, despite the fact that it has been a matter of evidence before the courts that I had the full permission of my then manager.
  19. Mr Cowling then argued that companies had the right to hire and fire at will. I argued that this was not the case for the following reasons:
    1. I had a very specific and detailed contract of employment which specified the procedure by which the contract might be terminated. I referred to the case of Polkey and said that dismissal without consultation and following proper procedure was unfair.
    2. That I had been falsely accused of gross misconduct and that the manner in which I was dismissed was damaging in the extreme to my reputation and ability to earn, thereby entitling me to make a claim for stigma damages.
    3. In his statement under oath, delivered in February 2000, the then CEO of Neural Technologies places great emphasis on the matter of confidentiality in this particular industry, due to the sensitive nature of the information that is often handled. There can therefore be no greater stigma than being accused of breaching confidentiality. The Chairman wilfully refused to see this point.
    4. The true reason for my dismissal came out over a year after my dismissal and it was that I was harassed out of the job by jealous and inadequate people who resented my position.
    5. In light of my reasoned arguments, the Chairman asked my witness how many employees were in Neural Technologies, the answer as I recall was in the region of 40. I then had to point out to the Chairman that at the time of my dismissal there were 56 employees. 50 is the critical number above which companies are legally bound to follow detailed disciplinary procedures, failure to do so results in potentially unfair dismissal. I contend that the Chairman was searching for a way out of the Polkey argument, and this would have been his only opportunity. Unable to produce any reasoned argument and in desperation, the Chairman adjourned the court and made a reserved decision.
  20. The Tribunal has deliberately and blatantly refused to administer the law, the Tribunal panel themselves arguing for the defence. This is a biased court.
  21. In point 26 of his Extended Reasons, Mr Cowling records that “a contract of employment can be lawfully terminated by the giving of notice” and with reference to damages, “By consent, this is £8000”. I was not given notice but summarily dismissed on false charges, refused an investigation or appeal, and have had to fight for two and a half years to clear my name. The sum paid is actually less than I was owed, by contract, at the time of dismissal and includes no interest element. There are outstanding sums due for pension contributions, relocation expenses plus other benefits. The court has simply obediently followed the instructions of the Respondent’s solicitors with no regard for reasoned legal arguments. The statement also implies that I agreed to this sum. Mr Cowling is misrepresenting fact.
  22. I have documented evidence that the Respondents have been motivated by malice throughout this case and have caused deliberate harm and damage to me on numerous occasions. The Respondents have presented multiple defamatory statements about me to the courts, have published inflammatory material on their website, have threatened me and I can now also prove that they have pursued me outside of the courts. I entered multiple claims for aggravated damages to the court but Mr Cowling makes no record of this. He is again misrepresenting fact.
  23. Since I can prove that the Respondents have behaved in a vexatious, frivolous and unreasonable manner throughout this case, I made an application to the court for a small sum to cover my costs. Mr Cowling makes no record of this. He is again misrepresenting fact.
  24. The court records that Simon Hancock found a copy of the e-mail on the 13th October. The evidence proves this to be incorrect, Mr Cowling is again deliberately misrepresenting fact.
  25. The court records that the company had become dissatisfied with my performance and that several complaints had been received, yet they refuse to qualify this argument and it runs counter to the evidence. The court makes absolutely no effort to determine the truth in this matter, which in itself is a failure to administer justice.
  26. The extensive bundle of evidence categorically proves that nothing the Respondents presented to the court is true, at either of the Southampton hearings or at the EAT hearing.
  27. It was established at the EAT in October 2001 that the newsletter at the centre of the argument had been published yet the Respondents again submitted the argument, against all the evidence that the newsletter had not been published. This was an act of blatant perjury, designed to pervert justice and to cause annoyance, which the Chairman records as “a possible misunderstanding!”
  28. My consistent objectives throughout this case have been:
    1. To clear my name.
    2. To determine the truth which, even with the detailed file of evidence, the Respondents will not admit.
    3. To receive an apology.
    4. To see justice served.
    5. To secure compensation, commensurate with the damage that the Respondents have caused, which will enable me to retrain and develop an alternative career since my reputation in this industry, through no fault of my own, has now been destroyed.




NAMED JOHN ROWLAND KEAR                  SIGNED: …………………………




BEFORE GERALD F. CARTER                       SIGNED: …………………………



ON THIS DAY,                                                    DATE: …….………………………