JOHN KEAR                        Appellant




NEURAL TECHNOLOGIES            Respondent




1.     According to the Employment Tribunals (Constitution and Rules of Procedure) Regulations, where a party has acted vexatiously, abusively, disruptively or otherwise unreasonably an order in respect of costs can be made against that party. An application for costs was made to the Tribunal at Southampton yet no consideration for this was given in the Extended Reasons, I contend that the court has erred in law. In support of my claim for costs I bring to the court’s attention the following points:

a.     The Respondents, Neural Technologies, have never had a case to answer yet have frivolously fought against the recovery of my contractual rights over a period approaching four years, at great expense to myself. I attach a schedule of costs for the court’s consideration and conservatively estimate that seven hearings have cost me £2,255 in materials, transport and accommodation alone. I generously make no claim for the cost of my time, which in itself would be considerable.

b.     The Respondents, Neural Technologies, have repeatedly misled the Employment Courts with false testimony all of which has been exposed before each hearing. They have again presented the same false testimony to each subsequent hearing, a vexatious and disruptive act designed to cause annoyance and further pervert the course of justice.

c.     The Respondents, Neural Technologies, made a counter claim which was not within the jurisdiction of the court and fabricated evidence in support of said claim. Not only have the actions of the Respondents been blatantly illegal but are also an abuse of process.

d.     The Respondents, Neural Technologies, have refused to comply with reasonable requests for information, have failed to comply with a Subject Access Request Notice under the Data Protection Act 1998 and have failed to comply with a direct court order for the release of evidence which is in their possession. They continue to act unreasonably and disruptively with the sole intention of causing confusion and delay against an un-represented party and have been highly successful in doing so.

e.     The Respondents, Neural Technologies and their legal counsel, have consistently acted in a threatening and abusive manner, introducing scandal at every opportunity in order to frighten me from making just and rightful claims against them.


2.     The Respondents breach of contract has resulted in further losses which the Tribunal at Southampton failed to consider.

a.     I am entitled to a further £500 relocation expenses to cover the three-month notice period of my contract of employment.

b.     I have suffered losses to my pension contribution at 5% of gross salary equating to £400 for the three-month notice period and for which I seek remedy.


3.     The main claim that I have against the Respondents is for one of damages to my professional reputation and career prospects under the heading of Malik, commonly known as stigma damages. This argument was presented to the Tribunal at Southampton which the Chairman, Donald Cowling admits in his comments. Mr Cowling had previously stated that he had given thorough consideration to the law in all matters yet this is clearly not the case with regards claims 1, 2 and 3.

a.     It has now been clearly established that Neural Technologies acted in breach of my contract of employment.

b.     They have continually acted in a deliberately malicious manner, carefully calculated to destroy my professional reputation.

c.     According to the guidance obtained in the case of Malik vs BCCI, if a contract of employment is breached in a manner which damages the reputation of the individual and harm’s the individual’s income potential, then there is no reason why that individual should not be entitled to damages as he would in an unfair dismissal case.

d.     The claim arises when there is a breach of the term “trust and confidence”.

e.     The full wording of the term is that “the employer will not, without reasonable and proper cause, conduct himself in a manner likely to destroy or seriously damage the relationship of trust and confidence between the employer and employee”, the emphasis is that of Lord Steyn in this case.

f.      Neural Technologies had no reasonable and proper cause to publish documents in the public domain, bearing my name, without my explicit permission and which caused damage to my reputation.

g.     When I complained about the above matter, Neural Technologies had no reasonable and proper cause to allow me to become the subject of harassment and victimisation, culminating in my dismissal.

h.     The directors of Neural Technologies had no reasonable and proper cause to search my personal correspondence using material to fabricate a false allegation of gross misconduct and which it is reasonably foreseeable caused sufficient damage to bring my career to an end.

i.      If for whatever reason, Neural Technologies had wanted to terminate my contract they could have done so with the giving of notice. In an e-mail of 13th October 1999, Simon Hancock acknowledges the importance of personal and professional reputation by stating “John and NTL agree to the story that he has resigned for whatever reason he feels appropriate”. It is therefore foreseeable that an accusation of gross misconduct will damage an individual’s prospects, this is a blatant breach of trust and confidence.

j.      Neural Technologies have had no reasonable, proper or even legal cause to repeatedly perjure themselves before the employment courts, perverting the course of justice for many years. They have maintained a ridiculous argument in the face of all evidence, stretching the administration of law and justice to seven hearings when they have had no legal basis for their stance and which Donald Cowling records as “a possible misunderstanding”.

k.     Neural Technologies presented a counter claim to the original Tribunal and which did not fall under the jurisdiction of the court. It later turned out the counter claim was based on fabricated evidence and despite a direct order of a court they refuse to release the evidence to confirm this.

l.      The case they rely on in defence, that of Nicholson vs Budget Insurance Ltd, places emphasis on establishing a breach of the implied term of trust and confidence through the corrupt and dishonest way in which the employer’s business is run. The evidence proves and there can be no doubt that Neural Technologies is a corrupt and dishonest business. They have perverted the course of justice over a period of many years through the use of perjury and fabricated evidence; they have refused to comply with a direct court order to secure evidence on which they originally relied; they have refused to comply with a Subject Access Request Notice, on no reasonable grounds, and are therefore also in breach of the Data Protection Act 1998.

m.    I am not a third party to their corrupt and dishonest practices, these practices have been aimed squarely at me in order to cause me professional damage.

n.     It is interesting to note that Companies House has no record of a company called Budget Insurance Limited as ever having been in existence.


4.     I wish the EAT to consider the arguments before it and to substitute a different decision to that of the Employment Tribunal at Southampton. The matters before the court are clear and concise. A referral back to the Tribunal at Southampton would be a denial of my Human Rights under Article 6 to a fair and unbiased hearing within a reasonable timescale. This case has already been a blatant abuse of my basic rights and has stretched over a period of almost four years when the matters could have been dealt with swiftly and efficiently at Southampton on February 22nd 2000.

5.     I wish to draw to the attention of the court the fact that Neural Technologies has set up two sister companies under the names of Nt2 and Nt3 Limited. These companies share the same directors, staff, product lines, premises and common identity. The fact these companies have been set up have already raised some interest and ridicule in the industry. They are vain attempts to dilute the revenue streams of the parent company, Neural Technologies, in order to reduce their financial exposure to legal action. They qualify on all grounds as a transfer of undertakings and should be equally liable for the judgement that this court will make today.

6.     It can be seen that Neural Technologies has sought any means possible to evade their financial and contractual responsibilities, causing great damage in the process and mainly via the use of blatantly illegal means.